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I. INTRODUCTION 
A woman takes the witness stand in a divorce proceeding. She works as a 
secretary in a government agency and testifies about the character of one of the 
higher-ups, a man named Bob. She doesn’t work for Bob directly and only 
encounters him infrequently in the workplace. After she gives testimony about 
Bob, she is fired. In an email explaining the decision, her boss writes that she 
was terminated because of her testimony. He says that she was otherwise an 
extraordinary employee, that he didn’t think this would affect her performance 
in any way, but that Bob was adamant she be fired for helping his ex-wife. There 
is no assertion she lied or said anything damaging to the agency while 
testifying.1 Does this retaliatory act by the government employer violate the 
First Amendment rights of the employee?  
This essay will describe how circuits are currently split on whether 
testimony given by public employees is per se a matter of public concern and 
then examine which analytical approach best promotes First Amendment 
values. This essay adds to current scholarly literature by arguing that the 
Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos endorses a context-heavy analysis in 
circumstances where context is particularly relevant to determining whether the 
individual is speaking as a public employee or as a citizen. When applied to 
public employee testimony, this context-heavy approach correctly recognizes 
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 1 This hypothetical is loosely based on Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1996).  
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the historical importance of allowing free and unpressured testimony, 
incentivizes truthful testimony from public employees, and protects public 
employees who provide testimony that does not significantly harm the 
government employer’s ability to operate efficiently.  
Part II briefly explains Supreme Court doctrine surrounding First 
Amendment claims by public employees prior to Garcetti. Part III describes the 
circuit court split on how to analyze whether a public employee’s testimony is 
a matter of public concern. Part IV argues that Garcetti provides for a context-
heavy analysis in certain circumstances where context is particularly relevant to 
determining whether an individual is speaking as a public employee or as a 
citizen. Part V asserts that providing sworn testimony is one of those unique 
circumstances warranting a context-heavy public concern analysis due to the 
traditional belief that individuals providing testimony serve a necessary public 
role. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC CONCERN FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Before the mid-twentieth century, government employment was viewed as 
a luxury, where “public employee[s] had no right to object to conditions placed 
upon [their] terms of employment.”2 As Justice Holmes wrote in Mclauliffe v. 
City of New Bedford, a policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”3 The speech of 
public employees was viewed as one large amalgam, their individual rights not 
distinguished by whether they were speaking as a citizen or as a public 
employee.4 Retaliation for speaking in a way the government employer 
disapproved was constitutionally permissible, even if the employee was 
speaking as a citizen.5 
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court repudiated this approach and 
proposed a new framework that attempted to determine whether the public 
employee was speaking as a public employee or as a citizen.6 As stated by the 
Court, the test provides: “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
 
 2 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (describing the history of public 
employee First Amendment analysis); see also Mclauliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 
216, 220 (1892) (“[T]he servant [almost always] agree[s] to suspend his constitutional rights 
of free speech . . . by the implied terms of his contract.”). 
 3 Mclauliffe, 155 Mass. at 220.  
 4 The Supreme Court initially adopted Justice Holmes’s view of public employees’ 
First Amendment rights—or lack thereof. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 
342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“It is . . . clear that [public employees] have no right to work for 
the State in the school system on their own terms.”). 
 5 See id.  
 6 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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employees.”7 In Pickering, a teacher wrote a letter complaining about the school 
board’s allocation of funding and was fired.8 The Court ultimately held the 
dismissal impermissible, as the subject of Pickering’s speech was “a matter of 
legitimate public concern” upon which “free and open debate is vital to 
informed decision-making by the electorate.”9  
Pickering should be viewed as an attempt by the Court to separate the 
previous amalgamation of citizen and public employee speech in order to 
preserve the rights of the public employee when speaking as a citizen. In 
creating the balancing test, the Court repeatedly referred to public concern and 
citizenship in the same breath; for example, the Court stated that it had 
“unequivocally rejected” the premise that public employees “may 
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they 
would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.”10 
The balancing test also emphasizes the role of the speaker as “a 
citizen . . . commenting upon matters of public concern.”11 The proximity of 
citizen and public interest is no accident. Rather, the Court’s examination of 
whether speech is a “matter of public concern” in Pickering is best seen not as 
an end in and of itself but rather as the means of deeming which role a public 
employee speech falls under: speech qua citizen or speech qua employee.  
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court further tied the concepts of public concern 
and citizenship together by embracing a definition of “public concern” that 
incorporated traditional philosophical conceptions of citizenship in Western 
democracy.12 The Court stated that “[s]peech deals with matters of public 
concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community.’”13 This description of public 
concern is nearly impossible to untether from the traditional Western concept of 
a citizen as an individual who “take[s] part in the life of their community, 
reserving a not insignificant part of their energies for the fulfillment of shared 
duties and goals . . . actively participat[ing] in deliberations concerning 
common matters.”14 In his book Active Liberty, Justice Breyer described this 
traditional conception of a citizen, writing:  
[When Jefferson] spoke of the rights of the citizen as “a participator in the 
government of affairs,” when Adams, his rival, added that all citizens have 
a “positive passion for the public good,” and when the Founders referred 
to “public liberty” . . . [t]hey had invoked an idea of freedom as old as 
antiquity, the freedom of the individual citizen to participate in the 
 
 7 Id. (emphasis added).  
 8 Id. at 566–67.  
 9 Id. at 571–72. 
 10 Id. at 568 (emphasis added). 
 11 Id. (emphasis added).  
 12 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 13 Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).  
 14 DANA RICHARD VILLA, SOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP ix (2001). This traditional conception 
of the Western citizen was advocated for by Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. Id.  
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government and thereby to share with others the right to make or to control 
the nation’s public acts.15 
 It is this traditional philosophical conception of an individual acting as a 
citizen that Pickering must be attempting to distinguish from an individual 
acting as a government employee. The alternative formalistic conception would 
be non-sensical, as whether an individual is a legal citizen has no bearing on the 
core First Amendment value of promoting public discourse and has never been 
considered as relevant to the Court’s public concern analysis.16 The public 
concern test therefore should not be a separate, discrete analysis from 
citizenship as some legal scholars assert.17 The two concepts are inseparable. If 
an individual is speaking on a matter of public concern, then they are speaking 
as a citizen. And if an individual is speaking as a citizen, then they are speaking 
on a matter of public concern. 
In Connick v. Myers, the Court laid down further substantive guidelines to 
determine if a public employee’s speech is on a matter of public concern: 
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.”18 If the 
speech is on a matter of public concern, then the public interest is balanced 
against the government’s managerial interest in effective and efficient 
fulfillment of its responsibilities.19 Again, the Court in Connick emphasized that 
the ultimate purpose of the public concern test was to determine if a public 
employee was speaking as a citizen or as a public employee: “[W]hen a public 
employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as 
an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review 
the wisdom of a personnel decision . . . . ”20  
The Court in Connick did not describe how much weight to give each factor 
of content, form, and context, but rather wrote that due to the variety of factual 
situations it was not “appropriate [n]or feasible to lay down a general 
standard.”21 This ambiguity has caused disagreement between various circuits 
on how much weight they can give to certain factors and whether one factor 
may be dispositive. The following section will consider one circumstance where 
 
 15 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3 
(2008).  
 16 The Supreme Court has held that identity discrimination is impermissible under the 
First Amendment, which would likely apply to non-citizens. See Michael Kagan, Do 
Immigrants Have Freedom of Speech?, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 84, 96 (2015). 
 17 Many of these formulations have arisen following Garcetti. See, e.g., Lemay 
Diaz, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech as a Citizen”: Why Lane 
v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee Truthful Testimony, 46 
SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 585 (2016). 
 18 Connick, v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
 19 Id. at 150–51.  
 20 Id. at 147 (emphasis added).  
 21 Id. at 154.  
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the circuits are currently split: whether context can be an overriding 
consideration in situations where public employees are retaliated against by 
their employer after testifying. 
III. THE CONTENT-HEAVY AND CONTEXT-HEAVY ANALYTICAL DIVIDE 
Circuits are split on whether testimony from public employees constitutes a 
per se matter of public concern. There are two diverging jurisprudential 
approaches taken by the circuits when addressing this question. The first 
approach is what I’ll call a context-heavy approach, which emphasizes context 
in the public concern analysis. The second is what I’ll call a content-heavy 
approach, which emphasizes content in the public concern analysis. The circuits 
which follow this latter approach do not claim to be giving more weight to 
content, but rather describe their approach as being even-handed with the 
Connick factors.22 However, in being even-handed with the factors and not 
adapting the weight given to the particular factual circumstance they are being 
applied, those circuits give too much weight to content and ignore the ultimate 
goal of the public concern analysis: to distinguish speech qua citizen from 
speech qua employee.  
The first context-heavy approach, adopted by the Fifth and Third circuits, 
holds that an employee’s testimony, regardless of the content, is a matter of 
public concern.23 In Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control District, the Fifth 
Circuit wrote that “when an employee testifies before an official adjudicatory 
or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is inherently of public 
concern.”24 The court’s rationale for this was largely focused on judicial 
integrity: 
If employers were free to retaliate against employees who provide truthful, 
but damaging, testimony about their employers, they would force the 
employees to make a difficult choice. Employees either could testify 
truthfully and lose their jobs or could lie to the tribunal and protect their 
job security . . . . Those unwell or unable to risk unemployment would 
scuttle our efforts to arrive at the truth.25  
Another case from the Fifth Circuit more explicitly supports its holding by 
invoking the judicial interest affected. In Reeves v. Claiborne County Board of 
 
 22 See Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for San Miguel Cty., 920 F.3d 651, 663 (10th Cir. 
2019) (“[W]e consider on a case-by-case basis the content, form, and context of a 
government employee’s testimony at issue in a given case in order to determine whether it 
involves a matter of public concern.”); Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Family 
Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[O]ur cases have rejected a blanket rule 
according absolute First Amendment protection to communications made in the course of a 
lawsuit.”). 
 23 Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1996).  
 24 Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578.  
 25 Id.  
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Education, the Fifth Circuit explained: If the government were free to retaliate 
against truthful testimony, “the judicial interest in attempting to resolve disputes 
by arriving at the truth would be in jeopardy . . . Yet, these values, along with 
the first amendment values, would not be served if the fear of retaliation and 
reprisal effectively muzzled witnesses testifying in open court.”26 
  It is without question that the judicial interest in promoting truthful 
testimony is of value, but that interest is not the focus of the public concern 
inquiry. The public concern inquiry is concerned with determining if 
“speech . . . can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, 
or other concern to the community.”27 The Third and Fifth Circuits correctly 
recognize that the interest in obtaining truthful testimony is a concern to the 
community, but what they don’t recognize is that providing free and 
unpressured testimony is a concern of the community regardless of the judicial 
interest in obtaining the truth. By neglecting to explore the traditions, history, 
and cultural importance of witness testimony, this narrow approach has opened 
itself up to additional criticism from other circuits. Not only do other circuits 
contend that the Supreme Court analysis does not allow for weighing one factor 
above others, the narrowness of the judicial integrity rationale has allowed other 
circuits to argue that this does not address the ultimate concern of the Pickering 
analysis: to determine whether the speech relates to a matter of concern to the 
community (and is therefore qua citizen).  
 This alternative content-heavy approach, taken up most recently by the 
Tenth Circuit, contends that the Supreme Court public concern analysis does not 
allow for context or form to be an overriding factor over content when 
determining if a public employee’s speech is a matter of public concern.28 
Courts which have taken this approach have condemned the context-heavy 
approach taken by the Third and Fifth Circuit as incorrectly applying the three 
factors laid down in Connick.29 As the Tenth Circuit wrote in Butler v. Board of 
County Commissioners, a rule treating sworn testimony as per se “a matter of 
public concern . . . contradicts the Supreme Court mandate, set forth in 
Connick . . . that we decide whether the speech is on a matter of public concern 
on a case-by-case basis, considering content, form, and context of the speech in 
a given case.”30 The Court then criticized the judicial integrity rationale the Fifth 
Circuit used to support their holding: “There are a number of other ways that 
courts protect the integrity of their truth-seeking function, including subpoena 
and contempt powers, cross-examination, and criminal sanctions for perjury, 
without expanding the essential task of Garcetti/Pickering.”31 
 
 26 Reeves v. Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(citation omitted). 
 27 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 28 See Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for San Miguel Cty., 920 F.3d 651, 660 (10th Cir. 
2019). 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
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However, in taking what they describe as an even-handed approach, these 
circuits elevate content above context and form by ignoring the possibility that 
certain situations demand weighing context and form above content. For 
example, in the particular context of an employee making statements pursuant 
to the duties of their employment, content could very well be inconsequential. 
If an auditor for the IRS is constantly harping about how taxes shouldn’t exist 
while performing an audit, then perhaps that individual should not be considered 
as speaking qua citizen on a matter of public concern even though the content 
of lowering taxes strongly weighs in favor of finding it to be of public concern. 
The next two sections will describe how (1) the Supreme Court has in fact held 
that context should be elevated above content when the employee is speaking 
pursuant to their official duties and (2) context should similarly be elevated 
above content when the employee is speaking in the form of sworn testimony.  
IV. GARCETTI DEVELOPING A CONTEXT-HEAVY ANALYSIS 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, a deputy district attorney (Ceballos) was tasked with 
reviewing an affidavit for factual inaccuracies.32 When Ceballos presented his 
findings to his superiors in a memorandum and at a meeting, he was sharply 
criticized for his handling of the case.33 He then was reassigned, transferred, and 
denied a promotion.34 
The Supreme Court held that Ceballos had no First Amendment claim.35 
The majority determined that the content of the memo was unimportant, writing 
that “the memo concerned the subject matter of Ceballos’ employment, but 
this . . . is nondispositive.”36 Rather, what the Court found dispositive was that 
“Ceballos’ . . . expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar 
deputy.”37 The Court reasoned that where employee speech is “made pursuant 
to official duties,” these restrictions do “not infringe any liberties the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”38 Because Ceballos made his 
statements pursuant to his official duties, he was not speaking as a citizen and 
did not get First Amendment protection.39  
Some circuits and scholars have interpreted Garcetti as providing an 
additional step in the Pickering test: initially asking whether the speech was 
made pursuant to his or her official duties before proceeding to the typical 
Pickering analysis.40 One issue with this additional step is that the Court has 
never explicitly adopted a three-step inquiry. In Garcetti, the Court wrote:  
 
 32 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413–14 (2006). 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. at 415.  
 35 Id. at 421.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Id.  
 38 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22.  
 39 Id.  
 40 See, e.g., Diaz, supra note 17, at 572; see also infra Part IV. 
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The first [step] requires determining whether the employee spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has 
no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s 
reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then . . . the question becomes 
whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for 
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general 
public.41  
The Court in Lane v. Franks reaffirmed that the analysis was a two-step 
inquiry and gave further insight on the Garcetti holding, writing that “[i]n 
describing the first step in [the two-step inquiry], Garcetti distinguished 
between employee speech and citizen speech.”42 Garcetti should be viewed not 
as establishing a new step, but rather as clarifying the ultimate purpose of the 
public concern analysis: distinguishing if the speech is qua citizen or qua public 
employee.  
The second issue with adding an additional step is conceptual. Consider a 
hypothetical where a court holds that an employee’s speech was indeed pursuant 
to his or her official duties, but instead of stopping its analysis, the court 
proceeds to determine if it was a matter of public concern. Let’s also say that in 
this case the content strongly weighs in favor of finding the speech to be of 
public concern. Context will certainly weigh in favor of the speech not being a 
matter of public concern because the speech took place pursuant to the 
employee’s official job duties.  
Applying the three-step approach creates two troubling possibilities. The 
first would occur if the Connick factors were weighted in the type of content-
heavy approach performed by the Tenth Circuit.43 In this situation, there would 
likely be a finding that the speech was of public concern due to its content. But 
because the speech was said pursuant to the employee’s official duties, the 
speech wouldn’t get First Amendment protection under the additional step 
derived from Garcetti. This holding would be quite odd. In both inquiries, the 
context of the speech is the same: pursuant to official duties. In both inquiries, 
the ultimate objective is the same: to determine if the individual is speaking qua 
citizen. Yet, following this approach yields a result where context is dispositive 
in one inquiry and inconsequential in the other.  
The second possibility is that a context-heavy analysis is performed. In this 
situation, the public concern analysis would yield the same result as the first 
step: because the speech was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties, 
regardless of the content, the speech would not be on a matter of public concern. 
But under this approach, the first step is entirely superfluous. If context is 
dispositive in the public concern analysis when individuals are found to be 
speaking pursuant to their official duties, then there is no reason to even have 
the first step.  
 
 41 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
 42 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 237 (2014). 
 43 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
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When applying the Connick factors, courts should instead ask whether one 
factor is particularly relevant to determining if the speech is qua citizen or qua 
public employee. For example, where individuals speak pursuant to their official 
duties, then that context is particularly relevant to whether they are speaking qua 
public employee and should be weighted more heavily, as Garcetti holds. This 
interpretation not only follows the court’s traditional two-step test, but has the 
benefit of recognizing that the ideas of citizenship and public concern heavily 
overlap. This analysis also lends itself to broad, nuanced applicability rather 
than being narrowly focused. For example, the next section will explore why an 
individual speaking in the context of being a sworn witness should per se be 
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  
V. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE TESTIMONY AND CONTEXT-HEAVY ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that citizens not only have a right 
to provide testimony, but a duty.44 In 1895, the Court wrote that “every citizen” 
has the affirmative duty to assist in prosecuting, securing punishment for breach 
of the peace, and to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws.45 
These duties are rooted in the English common law.46 As early as 1562, statutes 
were established compelling witnesses to appear and testify.47 In 1612, Lord 
Francis Bacon described providing sworn testimony as an affirmative duty, 
saying that “all subjects, without distinction of degrees, owe to the King tribute 
and service, not only of their deed and hand, but of their knowledge and 
discovery.”48 
Various circuits have held that because of the citizen’s duty to provide 
testimony, public employee testimony will never be “pursuant to their job 
duties.” The Seventh Circuit, in Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, held that “when a 
public employee gives testimony pursuant to a subpoena, fulfilling the ‘general 
obligation of [every] citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial,’ he speaks 
‘as a citizen’ for First Amendment purposes.”49 The Third Circuit, in Reilly v. 
City of Atlantic City, similarly held that “[w]hen a government employee 
testifies truthfully, s/he is not ‘simply performing his or her job duties,’ rather, 
the employee is acting as a citizen and is bound by the dictates of the court and 
the rules of evidence.”50 Both circuits interpreted Garcetti as if it established a 
discrete step separate from the public concern analysis. Declaring that the 
testimony constituted citizen speech, the Third and Seventh Circuit found that 
 
 44 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535–36 (1895). 
 45 Id. at 535.  
 46 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279–80 (1919). 
 47 Id. at 279. 
 48 Id. at 279–280 (quoting 2 How. St. Tr. 769, 778). 
 49 Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972)). 
 50 Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006)). 
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sworn testimony was not foreclosed from First Amendment protection by 
Garcetti, but held open the question of whether the speech was of public 
concern.51 
Circuits have largely been confused about how citizenship factors into the 
public concern analysis. Even with a per se rule that sworn testimony constitutes 
citizen speech, the Seventh Circuit has followed the content-heavy public 
concern analysis. In Wright v. Illinois Department of Children & Family 
Services, the Seventh Circuit wrote that it “share[d] [the] concern for the 
integrity of the judicial process, [but] [its] cases have rejected a blanket rule” 
finding that an “employee who testifies before an official government 
adjudicatory or fact-finding body speaks in a context that is inherently of public 
concern.”52  
This analysis is confused because to speak as a citizen is to speak as an 
individual who has a duty to the general public, and therefore when the duty is 
unfulfilled it is the general public who suffers. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the particular duty of a citizen to provide testimony is not a 
private duty, such as a fiduciary duty or a contractual duty, but a duty which is 
a “necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.”53 
Compelling written and oral testimony is “essential to the very existence and 
constitution of the court of common law, [as the court] could not possibly 
proceed with due effect without them.”54 The affirmative duty of citizens to 
provide sworn testimony to the public also explains the potential consequences 
for failing to meet that duty. For example, “the extraordinary power to jail those 
who refuse to cooperate with grand juries is rooted in the ‘longstanding principle 
that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’”55 There are exceptions 
to this general duty of the citizen to provide testimony. Most notably, the 
constitutional exemption under the Fifth Amendment, declaring that no person 
shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.56 But 
the Court has said these exceptions only exist in the most exceptional of 
circumstances.57 
If a public employee is fulfilling a duty as a citizen when testifying, and this 
is a duty owed not to a private party but to the public, then providing for free 
and unobstructed testimony would be a concern for every citizen. This interest 
exists regardless of the content of the testimony. A public employee providing 
sworn testimony is either fulfilling a duty to the public by providing truthful 
 
 51 See Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 741; Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. 
 52 Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 53 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). 
 54 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911) (quoting Amey v. Long, 9 East, 
484). 
 55 Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 742 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 
(1972)). 
 56 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 629 (1896). 
 57 See Blair, 250 U.S. at 281. 
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testimony or failing to meet that duty by providing false testimony. Where a 
duty is necessary to the welfare of the public, fulfilling the duty by providing 
truthful testimony maintains the welfare of the public. Failing to meet the duty 
by providing false testimony hurts the welfare of the public. In either case, the 
precise content of the testimony is irrelevant. It is the context of the public 
employee giving sworn testimony which makes it a matter of public concern.  
Concerns over false testimony or testimony particularly damaging to the 
employer can be dealt with when balancing the government employer’s interest 
with the individual’s interest.58 In those circumstances where false testimony is 
provided, the individual’s interest in commenting on a matter of public concern 
could be quite small, and the government employer’s managerial interest might 
be quite large. Similarly, if an employee says something that might be 
substantially damaging to efficient government operation, then even if the 
speaker had a strong personal interest, retaliation by the employer may be 
constitutionally permissible.  
However, in situations such as a secretary providing testimony in a divorce 
proceeding, where the sworn testimony is not damaging to government 
operations, weighing context as dispositive in the public concern analysis allows 
for important First Amendment protection. Rather than stopping the inquiry 
during the public concern analysis, the context-heavy approach allows a court 
to proceed to balance the individual’s interest against the government’s interest. 
In the hypothetical, the secretary has an interest in commenting, since she is 
fulfilling a duty to the public by providing testimony, whereas any harm to the 
government’s managerial efficiency is minimal. By providing this protection, 
the context-heavy analysis incentivizes truthful testimony by the secretary, stops 
unwarranted retaliation by the government, and correctly recognizes that the 
secretary fulfills a duty to the public at large when giving sworn testimony.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rather than blindly weighing factors when conducting the public concern 
analysis, courts should instead weigh the Connick factors focusing on how 
relevant they are to the ultimate purpose driving the public concern analysis: to 
determine whether the individual is speaking as a citizen or as a government 
employee. Where public employees speak pursuant to their official duties, 
context is dispositive, as Garcetti holds. Similarly, where public employees are 
giving sworn testimony, context should be dispositive, because it is the context 
of giving sworn testimony which creates their duty as citizens to the public. This 
weighted analysis not only faithfully follows the Court’s two-step approach, but 
will allow for a more nuanced, case-specific analysis in the future.  
 
 58 See supra Part I (describing the balancing test).  
